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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

SOME SUGGESTIONS IN ETHICS. By *Bernard Bosanquet, D.C.L., LL.D., Fellow of the British Academy.* London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1918. Pp. viii, 248. Price, 6s. net.

This is an extremely interesting work by an able and distinguished philosopher. It not only consists of varied topics, but is in many places lighted up by apt concrete illustrations. The subjects of the chapters are: Living for Others; The Social Good; Value and Goodness; Unvisited Tombs; Doubting the Reality of Evil; How Is One to Know What to Do?; Something Worth Knowing; On the Growing Repugnance to Punishment; We Are Not Hard Enough on Stupidity.

I shall select only a few points for critical reference. The treatment of "Value and Goodness" is not in all respects quite unexceptionable. On p. 49 we have "worth or goodness"; on p. 57, "goodness or value"; on p. 58, "value, worth, or goodness"; on p. 64, "value or goodness"; and already on p. 49, "value and goodness." Value and goodness are found with both "and," and "or," between them. Such a use of the word "goodness," without explication, in a work intended only for "ordinarily thoughtful persons," does not, in view of its usual connotations, seem quite commendable or happy, and surely value and worth might have sufficed. Some extenuation for his use of the term might be found, however, in the fact that Dr. Bosanquet does not seem to adhere very strictly to the class of reader intended, for on pp. 67, 69, we find him dropping into talk to "the student," and on p. 68 to "the philosophical student." The treatment of value here seems rather loose, and lacking at points in qualities of precision and discrimination. In speaking of the satisfaction realized in value-experience, he tells "ordinarily thoughtful persons" that "to ask whether it is a matter of intellect or of feeling appears unintelligent" (p. 57). Most of them, probably, will think it would be "unintelligent" not to ask even so little, and may retort that Dr. Bosanquet himself has asked it, or he could not have said, "It is appreciable therefore both by reason and by feeling, and must always in some degree be evident in a reaction upon both, although either may predominate." Here he is content to leave the matter. Happily not all philosophical writers on value have been content without asking more, to wit, the extent and significance of this acknowledged "predominance"—of reason or of feeling. The result has been the distinction of reason or truth values from will and feeling values, which would have done more to elucidate the subject of value than anything Dr. Bosanquet has advanced. As things are, nothing is done to show that, though objects "satisfy desire" or have "the property of satisfactoriness," their truth is not thereby established. In other words, no hint is vouchsafed of the fact that a value-judgment is not a truth-judgment. In a much later chapter he claims, indeed, that knowledge of values "involves knowledge of facts in a certain way and bearing" (p. 229).

"A certain way and bearing" may leave delightful scope for lack of thoroughness as to the world of truth and fact. The statement that "truth" is "a value" is one for proof rather than loose assertion, and creates the unfortunate impression that truth is hopelessly relative, to which there will be many a demur. If truth was to be taken as "a value," the sense—that, namely, of its being the satisfaction of a want—should have been explicitly shown in which it was to be so regarded. The unsatisfactoriness of the truth reference may be largely due to its meagre and casual character, but the subject is too important for loose indefinite treatment.

The fourth chapter, on "Unvisited Tombs," is an interesting one, but two of its pronouncements will provoke dissent. It insists, rightly, that value is individualistic, and the theory of values directed to high achievement, but something of the nature of self-contradiction and anti-climax awaits us when it is said (p. 85) that "the honor and responsibility of an achievement can never truly and justly be laid upon any individual, not even in the crystallized achievements of poetry, knowledge, beauty." Such a pronouncement is likely to meet with as little acceptance as it deserves. There is not much incentive to moral strenuousness about it. Every one knows and admits that heredity, time, environment, etc., have something to do with the making of individual achievement, and you may therefore say, if you please, that it does not belong wholly or solely to the individual; but Dr. Bosanquet himself expressly recognizes that there are "disvalues" that might keep the achievement from being realized, so that the fact that the individual does not allow these to keep him from realizing the achievement makes it "truly and justly" *his* achievement—which, without him, were not achieved; and there is, therefore, a true and well-recognized sense in which the "honor and responsibility" belong to him. The "honor and responsibility" of being a Plato, a Dante, a Shakespeare, are "truly and justly" theirs, all accessory facts notwithstanding. "The general indivisible spirit of things" has not obliterated moral distinctions, and reduced the world to a blank, inane, featureless unity.

Again, it is said (p. 85) there is no need for "primary reliance on individual survival as instrumental to continuing or completing in his own person his earthly functions or their analogue." One's work, he goes on to say, seems to be "resuming its absorption in the general thought and effect of the world." What is said in that connection is true enough of the work, but is largely irrelevant to the question of the worker and his survival, which is the point in hand. An "absorption" of his work in the "general human value" will never content souls that have achieved high values; they will still claim the wages of going on and not to die. The values, Dr. Bosanquet himself has said, "wholly apart from persons would be nothing" (p. 11): that being so, what is more natural and congruous than such "primary reliance" of the persons embodying value "on individual survival" for the spiritual continuity, persistence, and expansion, of those values. It does not speak highly for philosophical progress that the century-old answer of Fichte to Dr. Bosanquet's "student" and "statesman" would have been higher and more assured than Dr. Bosanquet's, for he would have asked them to say in almost so many words, "As surely as I am, my existence is a thought of God; whatever I am, in and by this thought, I am before all time, and do remain independent of all time and change. This thought will I strive to know—to its fulfilment will apply all my powers; then

shall they be employed on what is eternal, and their result shall endure for ever." In any case, the two pronouncements of Dr. Bosanquet do not impressively make for the strengthening of the sense of individuality, and they are not so much ethical as merely ontologic.

There is a great deal in the chapter on "Doubting the Reality of Evil" to which I can give cordial assent, so much so that I am only reluctantly critical. Nevertheless, it does not seem to me to get to the heart of the subject. Its weakness lies in respect of essential moral evil. There is a Leibnizian strain running through it, and our finiteness and narrowness are accordingly emphasized. But, when everything favorable is said, there remain the same radical defects as are found in the Leibnizian philosophy of evil. Because developing being must be imperfect, it does not follow that it must be the prey of moral evil, and it is absurd to treat liability to evil as though it were evil itself. The essentially inward and ethical nature, quality, and conditions, of moral evil are inadequately grasped and grappled with. Dr. Bosanquet does indeed speak of "biased choice," but the grave alternatives of moral choice are not pressed home to the seat or citadel of the situation. Thus, while one has largely enjoyed and endorsed his account, the unwilling conclusion of inadequacy forces itself upon the mind.

These critical references must not be allowed to obscure the fact that the book in whole makes good reading, and contains much sensible advice and many excellent suggestions. I heartily commend what its chapters have to say on life, literature, and art, as timely, sound, and wholesome.

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ESSAYS IN COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHY. By *C. E. M. Joad*. London: Headley Bros., Ltd., 1919. Pp. 252. Price, 8s. 6d. net.

How far may the amateur trespass upon the province of the philosopher is the question suggested by Mr. Joad's essays. He attacks certain philosophical problems as an intelligent foreigner and translates them into plain language for the plain man, and in so doing he is serviceable to the plain man, in providing him with a lucid, non-technical introduction to one or two questions.

The essays expound the New Realism, and are as the author claims, "sufficiently philosophic to sound singularly like nonsense to the plain man, while they are sufficiently akin in spirit and conclusions to the plain man's view of the every-day world as we know it to appear pedestrian and unsatisfying to most philosophers." He abandons any attempt to synthesize and unify the conflicting appearances of a world of sense into a correlated self-explanatory whole, and accepts an aggregate of things without apparent design or structure. He applies the realistic attitude of mind, as defined in the Introduction, to the relation of thought to temperament, pointing out that a man's philosophical opinions are really colored by his temperament, and to the theory of the State, dissenting here from the orthodox political theory as put forward by Hegel, T. H. Green, and others. The New Realism, which he recommends, "has taken much of the stuffing out of philosophy," and Mr. Joad's book, treating salient problems more shortly and less ambitiously than most philosophers have treated them, has its uses, and can be read with profit. M. J.